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CHAPTER 7
PRISON TRANSFERS AND THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE:
DISAPPEARING THE RULE OF LAW IN PRISON
SpearIt
Access to the legal system does not come easily for people in prison. There are
administrative procedures that must be exhausted; federal legislation like the Prison
Litigation Reform Act disadvantages prisoner-petitioners in multiple ways, including by
imposing significant limits on damages and creating financial disincentives for lawyers to
take on cases. 1 Such onerous legislation and lack of legal aid ensure genuine issues evade
redress. Sometimes, however, the law itself is the cause of evasion. Sometimes doctrine
prevents the Rule of Law from functioning in prison, particularly when a prison-transfer
moots a legal claim. In the most egregious situations, a transfer perverts justice by serving
as a subterfuge for prison officials to avoid liability for abusive conduct, unethical prison
policy, or the continued violation of constitutional rights. 2
Even absent such obstacles to accessing the legal system, litigating a case from prison
presents a unique set of difficulties beyond substantive law. Incarcerated people are a
particularly vulnerable class, some of which is due to their social and class status, including
the general lack of education, lack of legal resources, inability to afford an attorney, and
limitations in accessing the internet, telephones, and printed media. 3 Some of the
vulnerability is due to the prison’s sheer dominance over its subjects, which Erving Goffman
classically described as “total” because it directs practically every aspect of a person’s
existence and routine. 4 He found that the prison environment creates a lost sense of personal
safety coupled with the very real fact that the environment does not guarantee physical
integrity. The sentiment resounds loudly in the present as one scholar describes: “From
moving inmates, to reclassifying them, to taking away their legal paperwork, prison officials
exercise extreme levels of control over inmates’ lives.” 5 In the most toxic situations, prisonerpetitioners are known to face retaliation and other unfavorable treatment at the hands of
administration and staff for the act of filing a grievance or lawsuit. 6
What follows considers how transfer and mootness partner together to perform a
vanishing act; like a skillful magician and trusty assistant, transfer and mootness can make
justice disappear right before our very eyes. As a historical matter, mootness has been
conceived as a doctrine of fairness, but when triggered by a prison transfer, it is anything
but. Transfer and mootness are a lethal combination that can kill a legal claim and reduce to
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
See Tamika D. Temple, Mooted and Booted: How The Mootness Doctrine Has Been Used to Silence Violations of
Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights, 45 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 117, 131 (2020) (examining cases where transfers are
strategically implemented by prisons to moot claims).
3 Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners' Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 271, 278 (2010).
4 ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND
OTHER INMATES, xii (1961).
5 Michele C. Nielsen, Mute and Moot: How Class Action Mootness Procedure Silences Inmates, 63 UCLA L. REV.
760, 760 (2016).
6 See, e.g., Howard v. Foster, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (D. Nev. 2016) (prisoner-petitioner alleged he had items
confiscated in retaliation for filing a complaint against guard staff).
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nothing all the time, effort, and sacrifice of an individual who, under the hardship of prison,
has managed to crack through the judicial bureaucracy and get an audience in court. 7
The Power to Transfer: Unfettered Authority
One of the greatest powers of a prison administration is the ability to transfer a ward
to a different facility. The practice is nothing new, and was noted in the 1960s and 1970s,
when Muslims in prison were spearheading the prisoners’ rights movement. 8 Prisons would
break up Muslim organizing by transferring individuals out of the facility, sometimes as a
form of religious repression, sometimes to disrupt litigation. In more recent usage, prisons
use transfers to relocate alleged gang members or leaders. Courts have deferred to
institutional decision-making when it comes to transfers, and there is no protected right to
confinement in any particular prison or part of a prison. 9 The situation is somewhat ironic
since a transfer can lead to severe legal consequences for a prisoner-petitioner. It is a moment
when stakes are at their highest, and an individual is fully invested in litigation, only to be
blindsided by a forceful transfer to different living quarters, a move that dampens the chance
that a court will ever rule on the merits of his claim.
Aside from the direct legal consequences that flow from a transfer are personal
difficulties wrought by the experience. From the perspective of one incarcerated, a forced
transfer can be a major disruption and hardship. At the most basic level, a transfer disrupts
day-to-day living, often including the ability to continue receiving mail, medication, and
services like counseling and therapy. In addition, for those with legal matters pending in
court, a transfer may interfere with an array of matters, including communication between
an individual and his lawyer, disrupting legal documents and correspondences that must
follow the transfer, and creating the genuine possibility of delayed responses, lost
possessions, and lost mail, any of which can weaken one’s potential for success in court.
A transfer also interrupts key elements that contribute to rehabilitation. The move
may end visitation from relatives, friends, or other existing support systems and force the
transferee to become the new kid on the cellblock all over again. Whatever friendships have
been forged, jobs held, or goodwill established is extinguished. The rupture in routine may
include educational, vocational, or religious programming. An involuntary shift in living
circumstances creates tremendous strain on an individual, and in some cases, the very
individual who suffered at the hands of prison officials to the point of filing a claim. The
situation lends the impression that the transfer is a de facto punishment for filing the
lawsuit.
How Transfer Moots a Claim in Court
Of the many downsides to being transferred, perhaps the most unfortunate occurs
when the transfer becomes the basis to moot an individual or class action claim pending in
federal court. 10 A transfer can cause a case to lose an element of justiciability, making a claim
The case, Blake v. Ross, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016), offers a poignant example of both. In this case, the prisonerpetitioner suffered injury including nerve damages at the hands of guards, however his civil claim was
dismissed by the federal district court because the court found that he did not exhaust the prison protocol. The
case eventually went to the Supreme Court, which remanded the case back to the district court. While waiting
for his case to be decided, he was transferred to another prison, which subsequently mooted his case.
8 GARRETT FELBER, THOSE WHO KNOW DON’T SAY 62 (2020).
9 See Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1834 (2020).
10 See Nielsen, supra note 5, at 760 (examining how transfers and reclassification moots claims in the prison
class-action context).
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“moot” and essentially dismissing the action. 11 The Supreme Court has noted that mootness
can be understood as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence.” 12 A court’s finding of mootness due to transfer has the dramatic
and bizarre effect of preventing a prisoner-petitioner from maintaining a legal claim
involving the facility that allegedly did the wrongdoing. A transfer typically means that
whatever wrongdoing did occur, the state gets off free and is never held accountable for acts
against individuals who are among the most powerless.
While some successful prison cases have challenged the doctrine’s applicability over a
transfer, the act of transfer alone is usually enough to moot a claim. 13 In these instances, the
Rule of Law suffers a double violation: one for the initial wrong suffered at the hands of prison
officials, and a second for the fact that no one is ever brought to justice for it. The fear of
transfer is not imaginary, as noted by the plaintiff in Holt v. Hobbs, who voiced fears of this
tactic being used against him:
As part of that injunction, it stated that in my petition—because this is
something that’s become a real issue with me there at the penitentiary, at
Cummins Unit, that—that the defendants be banned or barred from
transferring me to another institution in retaliation for this litigation. It’s a
common tactic ADC uses to disrupt litigation. You understand what I’m
saying? 14
The plaintiff knew that being transferred from the facility that was the locus of a claim can
moot claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against officials. 15 While exceptions are
sometimes applied to the doctrine, they often come far and few between. 16 If the prison
happens to change or end the policy or practice that spawned the case, the claim will likely
be rendered moot, regardless of how far the litigation has progressed. As a result of this
practice, case after case shows courts ignoring what officials have done at a prison merely
11 There are two types of mootness, described as Article III mootness and prudential mootness. Article III
mootness derives from the U.S. Constitution, which limits federal court subject-matter jurisdiction to ongoing
“cases” or “controversies”—a transfer is an intervening act that effectively dissolves the controversy; Prudential
mootness is a residual power exercised by courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the case for “prudential”
reasons. For a claim awaiting appellate review that becomes moot, federal appeals courts typically reverse or
vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the district court with instruction for dismissal. Courts
consider both types in prison-based claims.
12 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).
13 See, e.g., Abdulhaseeb v. Clabone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (claim for injunctive relief not moot in part
because the transferred prisoner-petitioner named the director of the department of corrections as a defendant,
who has final policymaking authority over that prison system); Chapman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 285 F.
Supp. 3d 1204 (D. Colo. 2016) (relying on the reasoning in Abdulhaseeb to hold a claim by a federal prisonerpetitioner not moot because he sued the Bureau of Prisons, an entity capable of altering its conduct).
14 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Joint appendix On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of
Appeals For The Eighth Circuit, Holt v. Hobbs No. 13-6827 (filed Apr. 23, 2014),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docketfiles/13-6827.htm.
15 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Sec. 2201 allows declaratory judgments in “a case of actual controversy”; 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a) restricts injunctive relief to a “particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.”
16 Among the limited exceptions that courts make in the prison context are “voluntary cessation,” when a
defendant voluntarily ceases the allegedly unlawful conduct but is free to resume the conduct, see Heyer v. U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d at 212; conduct deemed “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” when the
conduct occurs in the short term and has potential for recurrence but does not last long enough for judicial
review, for a positive example, see Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1980); This exception applies in
“exceptional situations” only where the plaintiff “can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected
to the alleged illegality.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
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because the institution has stopped the violative conduct or because the prisoner-petitioner
has been shifted to another facility.
The injustices that result from transfer and mootness are multiple since an individual
may be forced to pay the draconian price of a transfer, which was done with the intent of
shielding prison officials from wrongdoing that is now compounded by having one’s life turned
upside down—all for trying to play by the rules. The outcomes are particularly heinous
because they nullify the many investments that go into filing a claim in the first place.
Reclaiming the Rule of Law
In the United States, prisons stand as an exception to ideals enshrined in the Rule of
Law, literally an exception to the Rule. Behind bars, the Rule exists in a diminished capacity,
and sometimes in suspension altogether. Whether it be the cherished ideal of “getting one’s
day in court” or that nobody “is above the law,” these and related principles are sorely lacking
in the prison context, where people are at their most vulnerable and the state holds a nearmonopoly of power.
Perhaps most obviously, there is a need to reform transfer practices and reform
judicial norms about the unique harm that ensues when prisons transfer a ward. Transfer
practices have recently come under public scrutiny due to their facilitating the spread of
Covid-19. Still, as this chapter has shown, that issue is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
Courts have a transformative role to play in reforming this situation, but they have
been largely unwilling to close this loophole. The situation is unfortunate because doing so
would strengthen their commitment to the Rule of Law and because courts have helped
perpetuate the problem in many ways. 17 Steps forward might include courts working to
ensure no individual has to give up a legal claim due to a forced transfer. We have already
seen how the naming of defendants can make the difference between whether a suit is
allowed to continue despite a transfer. Courts might do well to follow the lead of Chief Justice
Rehnquist in this regard, who suggested “while an unwillingness to decide moot cases may
be connected to the case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated connection
that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override it.” 18 One scholar has
continued this line of reasoning by arguing for the de-constitutionalizing of mootness from
Article III altogether because, as he writes, “neither the text, the history, nor the structure
of Article III forbids federal courts from entertaining moot cases.” 19 Under a bolder judicial
approach, courts have been called on to abolish mootness doctrine from its application in the
prison context. 20 One wonders how the Supreme Court might exert influence through its
supervisory powers to address these miscarriages of justice occurring on Court watch.
Assuming courts are reluctant to decouple mootness from its Article III heritage,
courts might reimagine the scope for excepting the rule. For example, a recent case held that
the prisoner-petitioner’s claims for equitable relief were not moot despite being transferred
around the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 21 In that case, the court found that the petitioner,
Aside from granting mootness, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 480 (1995) (“The due process clause of the Federal
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, standing alone, confers on a state prison inmate no liberty interested in
freedom from state action taken within the sentence imposed.”).
18 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331 (1988).
19 Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 655
(1992).
20 Temple, supra note 2, at 142.
21 Reid v. Hurwitz, 920 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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housed in various Security Housing Units (“SHUs”), was subject to mistreatment by prison
staff in violation of BOP policy. The court found that since he had already been mistreated
at several SHUs, the transfer was irrelevant because he was in the SHU in different facilities,
suffered the same harms in different SHUs, and because prison officials claimed they were
following policy. Together, these facts set conditions for prison conduct capable of repetition
but evading review. Under a more common-sense approach, this exception could be used more
expansively. Moreover, the stringent nature of the exception requires that the repetition be
capable against the same person who experienced the initial wrongdoing. The problem is,
however, this does nothing for those left behind, and just because there may be no likelihood
of repetition against that very individual, it hardly allays fear that the same conduct is not
capable of repetition against another. Courts would do well to recognize how harms are
perpetuated by a stringent read of this exception.
Despite being an unlikely avenue for reform, legislation is another obvious way to
address these issues. Recent legislative developments have benefitted people in prison,
showing that legislation is not out of the question. 22 In addition to these new laws that
advance education and reentry, lawmakers could continue the trend by restricting a prison’s
ability to transfer any individual who has a live case in court. At a bare minimum, legislation
should delay any transfer until the end of litigation. Such a move by legislators would
guarantee more just outcomes and remove the suspicion that the transfer process was abused
to shield officials from litigation.
The most ideal solution would be for the executive branch to self-regulate on these
unfair and unseemly practices. However, the idea that prisons might crack down on
themselves may be wishful thinking given the dual nature of the task, which involves
actually accounting the misconduct of their employees and ensuring that transfer is never
used to circumvent attempts to redress the harm. At present, hardly one or the other is
checked, which makes the likelihood of achieving both even less so. When it comes to lawsuits
against prison personnel, prisons should be trying to uphold the Rule of Law and set an
example for the rehabilitation of their wards. People serving a sentence are supposed to be
in the process of learning respect for the law but instead see prisons using their powers to
subvert it by mastering existing loopholes and allowing oppression to fester. For one who has
had a case mooted by a transfer—it offers every incentive to reconsider whether following the
law is worth the pain.
By now, this chapter hopes to have shown the mistake it is to think everyone gets that
day in court. For people in prison, it is simply not true, and as a result, justice is ignored and
unlawfulness is propagated. Transfer and mootness bring this point into sharp relief and
underscore the law’s violence against those with the least means of defending themselves.
While opponents of mass incarceration have documented an array of maladies that spring
from this power imbalance, this piece seeks to remind that, at the bottom of it all, the system
of redress is largely broken. People in prison are constantly taught they will not get their day
in court and that prison officials are above the law. The legal breakdown that occurs in the
face of one who has followed the law is the ultimate slap in the face. The injustice guarantees
the perpetuation of others that will never be brought to light and guarantees fewer
individuals will bother with the perilous work of filing a claim.

22 One example is recent action by Congress to reinstate Pell Grant funding for people in prison as well as the
First Step Act, which provides for programs to help reduce recidivism among other purposes.

